README gets the full contract (request/response shape, the cost ceiling and
why it exists, the block-width cap and expiry, and the two new tables).
CLAUDE.md gets the two rules that are easy to undo by accident: the endpoint
must never serve unauthenticated, and the width cap and expiry are policy
decisions rather than tuning knobs.
ipblock_registered and domain_blocked only ever meant "we posted this
block once" — they said nothing about whether it still exists. When the
API went live it was publishing 24 /32 ranges that had been removed by
hand on 2026-07-21, so ~17% of the IP list didn't block anything. That's
a bad thing to hand another admin an importer for.
app/reconcile_blocks.py fetches Mastodon's live Admin::IpBlock and
Admin::EmailDomainBlock lists and maintains a new block_active column on
both tables: off for rows whose block is gone or whose expires_at has
elapsed, back on for any that reappear. The API serves only active rows.
Re-registering a block reactivates its row, so a range the bot blocks
again after a manual cleanup comes back on its own.
A failed fetch changes nothing — not a 403 from a missing scope, not
Mastodon being down, not a half-failure where one list answers and the
other doesn't. An outage must never be read as "every block was
removed"; the list degrades to over-reporting rather than emptying
itself, and there's a test for each of those paths.
Needs admin:read:ip_blocks + admin:read:email_domain_blocks, added to
the live token in place (scopes updated on the existing Doorkeeper
token, matched by digest) rather than by minting and rotating, so the
token value is unchanged and .env needed no edit.
Publishes the IP ranges and email domains the bot has auto-blocked as
JSON: GET /api/blocks, /api/blocks/ip-ranges, /api/blocks/email-domains,
each taking an optional ?limit=N.
The endpoints are unauthenticated, so BLOCKS_API_ENABLED gates them and
defaults to false — with it unset the paths 404 as if they didn't exist.
Publishing which ranges are already blocked also tells a spam signup
which ones to avoid, so opting in is a per-deployment call; yttrx.com
sets it true in the box's .env.
Responses assert only that a block exists: the blocked range/domain, a
signups count, and first/last seen. No account identifiers, and none of
the ipapi.is or check-mail.org classification that drove the decision —
republishing a paid reputation feed's verdicts on an open endpoint would
be redistributing their data rather than ours.
Supporting changes:
- signup_ip gains a block_cidr column (migrated in place on open) so the
API reports the network actually blocked rather than the signup IP.
Rows predating it fall back to that IP's /32 or /128, which is exactly
what was registered before range-blocking started 2026-07-15.
- register_ip_block / register_email_domain_block now return whether the
block landed, and the caller only marks it registered on success, so a
failed POST is no longer published as a block that exists.
Deploy target was cleaned up to just docker-compose.yml + .env (+ .env.bak-*
snapshots) after switching to registry-pulled images. Fixes references to
git pull, chown waffles, and app/main.py.bak rollback that no longer apply.
Watches every account flagged by IP-scrutiny or email-domain scrutiny at
signup and, once it goes live, records a baseline post/follow count. A
scheduled sweep (app/suspicious_sweep.py, run via cron on admin.yttrx.com)
suspends any watch past SUSPICIOUS_GRACE_HOURS with zero new posts and
zero new follows since that baseline; any activity clears the watch.
Works whether yttrx is open-registration or requires moderator approval,
since the watch starts at whichever event actually makes the account live
(account.created vs account.approved), same dual handling the welcome flow
already uses. Needs ABUSE_BOT_TOKEN re-minted with admin:read:accounts.
Classifies each signup's email domain (domain-only, GDPR-friendly) alongside
the existing IP scrutiny signal, with matching held-welcome and auto
email_domain_block behavior. A report against an account with a flagged
domain suspends immediately (no reporter-count threshold) and blocks the
domain, classified live from the report payload rather than any signup-time
record so it also covers pre-existing accounts. Ships CHECK_MAIL_DRY_RUN=true
by default, independent of ABUSE_DRY_RUN, so the new report-triggered suspend
path stays inert until watched.
pmb
waffle2k