Host networking shares the host net namespace, so the host's privileged-port rule applies and the image's non-root user cannot bind 79 -- the daemon fails to listen silently. Add user: "0:0" to the compose and correct the earlier (wrong) claim that non-root bind still works. Note setcap as the non-root alternative.
41 lines
1.6 KiB
YAML
41 lines
1.6 KiB
YAML
version: '3.8'
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services:
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finger:
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build: .
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# IMPORTANT: host networking is what lets the daemon's abuse protection
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# work. Under Docker's default bridge networking every external client is
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# SNAT'd to the bridge gateway (a 172.16/12 address), so the daemon sees a
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# single source IP for everyone -- the per-IP ban logic can't tell clients
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# apart and (by design) treats that private address as untrackable, leaving
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# banning inert. Host networking exposes the real client IP, so repeat
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# offenders actually get blocked.
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network_mode: host
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# Under host networking the container shares the host net namespace, which
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# uses the host's privileged-port rule -- so the image's non-root user
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# (UID 1000) cannot bind port 79 and the daemon fails to listen silently.
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# Run as root to bind it. (Alternative: setcap cap_net_bind_service on the
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# binary in the image to keep it non-root.)
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user: "0:0"
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volumes:
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- ./users:/var/finger/users
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restart: unless-stopped
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healthcheck:
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test: ["CMD-SHELL", "nc -w 1 127.0.0.1 79 < /dev/null || exit 1"]
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interval: 30s
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timeout: 10s
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retries: 3
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start_period: 40s
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# Bridge-networking alternative (quick local testing only). NOTE: with this
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# mode the daemon only ever sees the bridge gateway IP, so abuse protection
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# is effectively disabled. Prefer host networking above for any public-facing
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# deployment.
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# finger:
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# image: ghcr.io/waffle2k/finger:latest
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# ports:
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# - "79:79"
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# volumes:
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# - ./users:/var/finger/users
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# restart: unless-stopped
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