Add read-only blocklist API (off by default)

Publishes the IP ranges and email domains the bot has auto-blocked as
JSON: GET /api/blocks, /api/blocks/ip-ranges, /api/blocks/email-domains,
each taking an optional ?limit=N.

The endpoints are unauthenticated, so BLOCKS_API_ENABLED gates them and
defaults to false — with it unset the paths 404 as if they didn't exist.
Publishing which ranges are already blocked also tells a spam signup
which ones to avoid, so opting in is a per-deployment call; yttrx.com
sets it true in the box's .env.

Responses assert only that a block exists: the blocked range/domain, a
signups count, and first/last seen. No account identifiers, and none of
the ipapi.is or check-mail.org classification that drove the decision —
republishing a paid reputation feed's verdicts on an open endpoint would
be redistributing their data rather than ours.

Supporting changes:

- signup_ip gains a block_cidr column (migrated in place on open) so the
  API reports the network actually blocked rather than the signup IP.
  Rows predating it fall back to that IP's /32 or /128, which is exactly
  what was registered before range-blocking started 2026-07-15.
- register_ip_block / register_email_domain_block now return whether the
  block landed, and the caller only marks it registered on success, so a
  failed POST is no longer published as a block that exists.

.env.example

@@ -222,3 +222,30 @@ SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_ACTION=suspend
 # SUSPICIOUS_DRY_RUN's by-design "false" default above, since this is a
 # brand-new action path. Flip to "false" once the moderator DMs look right.
 SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_DRY_RUN=true
+
+# --- Blocklist API (app/main.py, GET /api/blocks) ---------------------------
+# Read-only JSON of the IP ranges and email domains this bot has auto-blocked:
+#   GET /api/blocks                 both lists in one document
+#   GET /api/blocks/ip-ranges       registered Admin::IpBlock networks
+#   GET /api/blocks/email-domains   registered Admin::EmailDomainBlock domains
+# Optional ?limit=N on any of them. Responses assert only that a range/domain
+# is blocked — no account handles, account ids or email addresses, and none of
+# the ipapi.is / check-mail.org classification behind the decision (publishing
+# those verdicts would be redistributing a paid reputation feed's data). Note
+# this reports the *bot's own* record, not Mastodon's full blocklist: blocks a
+# moderator added by hand in the admin UI aren't in it.
+#
+# SERVED WITHOUT AUTHENTICATION, so it defaults to off and every deployment
+# must opt in: publishing which ranges and domains are already blocked also
+# tells a would-be spam signup which ones to avoid. With this unset the three
+# paths 404 as if they didn't exist. yttrx.com sets this to true.
+BLOCKS_API_ENABLED=false
+
+# Hard ceiling on entries per response, whatever ?limit asks for — the
+# endpoint is unauthenticated, so response size can't be left to the caller.
+BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS=5000
+
+# Cache-Control max-age (seconds) on blocklist responses. The data only
+# changes when a signup is flagged, so a few minutes of client/intermediate
+# caching costs nothing.
+BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS=300

CLAUDE.md

@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@ A FastAPI webhook server. One Mastodon admin webhook delivers `account.created`,
   and auto-**silence** young/dormant accounts past the threshold — lowered for
   accounts with a flagged signup IP (see README).
 
+Alongside the webhook it serves an optional read-only **blocklist API** —
+`GET /api/blocks`, `/api/blocks/ip-ranges`, `/api/blocks/email-domains` —
+publishing the IP ranges and email domains the bot has auto-blocked. It is
+unauthenticated, so it 404s unless `BLOCKS_API_ENABLED=true`; yttrx.com sets
+that in the box's `.env`, the shipped default is off. Responses assert only
+*that* a block exists — no account identifiers, and deliberately none of the
+ipapi.is / check-mail.org classification behind the decision, so we're not
+republishing a paid reputation feed's verdicts. See README.md's "Blocklist
+API" section.
+
 A separate scheduled module, `app/suspicious_sweep.py` (run via
 `python -m app.suspicious_sweep`, not part of the webhook server), suspends
 any IP- or email-flagged signup that shows zero new posts and zero new
@@ -46,6 +56,12 @@ user-memory note `project_welcomebot` has the current state.
 - The bot **silences** (reversible), it does not suspend by default
   (`ABUSE_ACTION=silence`). It applies the action **without** `report_id` so the
   report stays open for human review.
+- **The blocklist API must stay classification-free.** `/api/blocks` is
+  public and unauthenticated; entries may say a range/domain is blocked and
+  when, never *why*. Don't add the ipapi.is verdict, the org name, or
+  check-mail.org's disposable/risk fields back into the response — that would
+  be redistributing a paid reputation feed's data. Account identifiers
+  (handles, ids, emails, raw signup IPs) are out for the usual reasons.
 - **`admin.yttrx.com`'s `/root/yttrx-welcomebot/` is not a git repo any more**
   (cleaned up 2026-07-06). Don't `git init`/clone it back into place — the
   registry image + `docker-compose.yml`/`.env` is the whole deploy surface now.

README.md

@@ -191,6 +191,63 @@ section for the remint procedure.
 Inspect the watch list: `welcomebot-suspicious` / `welcomebot-suspicious --pending`
 (see `bin/welcomebot-suspicious`).
 
+## Blocklist API (`/api/blocks`)
+
+An optional, **read-only** JSON view of what the bot has auto-blocked. Three
+endpoints, all `GET`, all accepting an optional `?limit=N`:
+
+| Path | Returns |
+|---|---|
+| `/api/blocks` | both lists in one document |
+| `/api/blocks/ip-ranges` | networks registered as `Admin::IpBlock` |
+| `/api/blocks/email-domains` | domains registered as `Admin::EmailDomainBlock` |
+
+```json
+{
+  "generated_at": "2026-09-13T00:00:00+00:00",
+  "ip_ranges": {
+    "count": 1,
+    "items": [
+      {"cidr": "198.51.100.0/24", "signups": 3,
+       "first_blocked_at": "2026-07-15 09:12:04",
+       "last_blocked_at": "2026-08-30 22:41:18"}
+    ]
+  },
+  "email_domains": {
+    "count": 1,
+    "items": [
+      {"domain": "temp-mail.org", "signups": 2,
+       "first_blocked_at": "2026-07-03 11:02:55",
+       "last_blocked_at": "2026-07-19 16:30:09"}
+    ]
+  }
+}
+```
+
+**Off by default.** These paths are served *without authentication*, so they
+404 unless `BLOCKS_API_ENABLED=true` is set — publishing which ranges and
+domains are already blocked also tells a would-be spam signup which ones to
+avoid, and that's a per-deployment call. yttrx.com opts in; the shipped
+default doesn't. `BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS` (default 5000) caps the response size
+whatever `?limit` asks for, and `BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS` (default 300) sets
+the `Cache-Control: public, max-age=…` on responses.
+
+What the response deliberately does **not** contain:
+
+- **No account identifiers** — no handles, account ids, emails or signup IPs.
+  Repeat signups out of one range collapse into a single entry with a
+  `signups` count.
+- **No classification data.** The ipapi.is verdict (`datacenter`/`proxy`/…),
+  the org name, and check-mail.org's disposable flag and risk score all stay
+  out of the response. They're what *drove* each decision, but republishing a
+  paid reputation feed's verdicts on an open endpoint would be redistributing
+  their data rather than ours. An entry asserts only that the block exists.
+
+Scope: this is the **bot's own record**, not Mastodon's full blocklist —
+blocks a moderator added by hand in the admin UI are not in it. Entries appear
+only once the block actually landed on the Mastodon side (a failed
+`POST /api/v1/admin/ip_blocks` is logged and *not* recorded as blocked).
+
 ## Layout
 
 | Path | Purpose |
@@ -199,7 +256,7 @@ Inspect the watch list: `welcomebot-suspicious` / `welcomebot-suspicious --pendi
 | `app/suspicious_sweep.py` | Scheduled sweep: suspends flagged signups with no activity (run via cron, not the webserver) |
 | `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml` | Container build + run |
 | `.env.example` | Config template (copy to `.env`, never commit) |
-| `nginx/hooks.yttrx.com.conf` | nginx site for admin.yttrx.com |
+| `nginx/hooks.yttrx.com.conf` | nginx site for admin.yttrx.com (webhook, healthz, blocklist API) |
 | `bin/welcomebot-logs`, `bin/welcomebot-signups`, `bin/welcomebot-suspicious` | Ops CLIs installed to `/root/bin` on admin.yttrx.com |
 | `test_local.py` | Offline smoke test (no network) |
 

app/main.py

@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ Mastodon signs every delivery with:
 One Mastodon webhook subscribing to both events points at /webhook; both
 share the single WEBHOOK_SECRET. See README.md for the deploy + Mastodon-side
 configuration runbook.
+
+Alongside the webhook, an optional read-only blocklist API publishes what the
+bot has auto-blocked — ``GET /api/blocks``, ``/api/blocks/ip-ranges``,
+``/api/blocks/email-domains``. It is unauthenticated and therefore off unless
+``BLOCKS_API_ENABLED`` is set; see that config entry.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -45,6 +50,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
 import httpx
 from fastapi import BackgroundTasks, FastAPI, Header, HTTPException, Request
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
 
 logging.basicConfig(
     level=logging.INFO,
@@ -220,6 +226,23 @@ SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_ACTION = os.environ.get("SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_ACTION", "suspe
 # by-design "false" default above) since this is a brand-new action path.
 SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_DRY_RUN = os.environ.get("SUSPICIOUS_COMBINED_DRY_RUN", "true").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
 
+# --- Public blocklist API ---------------------------------------------------
+# Read-only JSON of the blocks this bot has registered (GET /api/blocks and
+# friends). Served WITHOUT authentication when enabled, so it defaults to
+# "off" and must be opted into per-deployment: publishing which ranges and
+# domains are already blocked also tells a would-be spam signup which ones to
+# avoid, and that's a per-instance call, not a safe default. yttrx.com sets
+# BLOCKS_API_ENABLED=true in its .env; every other deployment 404s.
+BLOCKS_API_ENABLED = os.environ.get("BLOCKS_API_ENABLED", "false").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
+# Hard ceiling on how many entries one response may return, whatever ?limit
+# asks for — this endpoint is unauthenticated, so the response size can't be
+# left to the caller.
+BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS = int(os.environ.get("BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS", "5000"))
+# Cache-Control max-age (seconds) on blocklist responses. The underlying data
+# changes only when a signup is flagged, so letting clients and any
+# intermediate cache hold it for a few minutes costs nothing.
+BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS", "300"))
+
 if not WEBHOOK_SECRET:
     log.warning("WEBHOOK_SECRET is empty — signature verification will reject all requests.")
 if not BOT_ACCESS_TOKEN:
@@ -238,6 +261,10 @@ app = FastAPI(title="yttrx welcome-bot + abuse-bot")
 _db_lock = threading.Lock()
 
 
+def _column_exists(conn: sqlite3.Connection, table: str, column: str) -> bool:
+    return any(row[1] == column for row in conn.execute(f"PRAGMA table_info({table})"))
+
+
 def _init_db() -> None:
     os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(DB_PATH), exist_ok=True)
     with sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH) as conn:
@@ -268,9 +295,18 @@ def _init_db() -> None:
             "  org        TEXT,"
             "  flagged    INTEGER,"
             "  ipblock_registered INTEGER DEFAULT 0,"
+            "  block_cidr TEXT,"
             "  classified_at TEXT DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"
             ")"
         )
+        # block_cidr was added after the table shipped (it records the network
+        # register_ip_block actually blocks, which is what /api/blocks
+        # publishes). Rows written before this column existed keep it NULL and
+        # fall back to the single-address /32 or /128 of their signup IP —
+        # which is exactly what was registered back then, since blocking the
+        # ASN route CIDR only started 2026-07-15.
+        if not _column_exists(conn, "signup_ip", "block_cidr"):
+            conn.execute("ALTER TABLE signup_ip ADD COLUMN block_cidr TEXT")
         conn.execute(
             "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ipapi_range_cache ("
             "  family        INTEGER NOT NULL,"  # 4 or 6
@@ -368,15 +404,16 @@ def record_action(target_id: str, acct: str, action: str, tier: str,
 
 
 def record_signup_ip(account_id: str, acct: str, ip: str, classification: str,
-                     org: str, flagged: bool) -> None:
+                     org: str, flagged: bool, block_cidr: str = "") -> None:
     with _db() as conn:
         conn.execute(
             "INSERT OR REPLACE INTO signup_ip "
             "(account_id, acct, ip, classification, org, flagged, "
-            " ipblock_registered) "
+            " ipblock_registered, block_cidr) "
             "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, "
-            "  COALESCE((SELECT ipblock_registered FROM signup_ip WHERE account_id = ?), 0))",
+            "  COALESCE((SELECT ipblock_registered FROM signup_ip WHERE account_id = ?), 0), ?)",
-            (account_id, acct, ip, classification, org, int(flagged), account_id),
+            (account_id, acct, ip, classification, org, int(flagged), account_id,
+             block_cidr or None),
         )
 
 
@@ -526,6 +563,104 @@ def start_suspicious_watch(account_id: str, acct: str, reasons: str,
         )
 
 
+def _fallback_cidr(ip: str) -> str:
+    """The single-address CIDR for ip, used for signup_ip rows written before
+    block_cidr existed — that's the block that was registered for them."""
+    try:
+        addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
+    except ValueError:
+        return ""
+    return f"{addr}/{32 if addr.version == 4 else 128}"
+
+
+def blocked_ip_ranges(limit: int = 0) -> list[dict]:
+    """Every network this bot has registered an Admin::IpBlock for, newest
+    first, collapsed to one entry per distinct CIDR.
+
+    Repeat signups out of the same range are common (that's the point of
+    blocking the range rather than the address), so entries carry a `signups`
+    count and the first/last time the range was hit rather than appearing once
+    per account.
+
+    Entries state only *that* a range is blocked. The ipapi.is classification
+    and org that drove the decision stay out of the response on purpose: this
+    is an unauthenticated endpoint, and republishing a paid IP-reputation
+    feed's verdicts would be redistributing their data, not ours. The same
+    goes for identifying anything about the accounts involved.
+    """
+    with _db() as conn:
+        rows = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT block_cidr, ip, classified_at "
+            "FROM signup_ip WHERE ipblock_registered = 1 "
+            "ORDER BY classified_at DESC"
+        ).fetchall()
+
+    grouped: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for block_cidr, ip, classified_at in rows:
+        cidr = block_cidr or _fallback_cidr(ip or "")
+        if not cidr:
+            continue
+        entry = grouped.get(cidr)
+        if entry is None:
+            grouped[cidr] = {
+                "cidr": cidr,
+                "signups": 1,
+                "first_blocked_at": classified_at,
+                "last_blocked_at": classified_at,
+            }
+        else:
+            # rows are newest-first, so every later row is an older sighting
+            entry["signups"] += 1
+            entry["first_blocked_at"] = classified_at
+
+    return _capped(list(grouped.values()), limit)
+
+
+def blocked_email_domains(limit: int = 0) -> list[dict]:
+    """Every domain this bot has registered an Admin::EmailDomainBlock for,
+    newest first, one entry per distinct domain.
+
+    Domains only — the bot never stores or forwards a full signup address (see
+    classify_email_domain), so there is none to expose here.
+
+    As with blocked_ip_ranges, entries state only *that* a domain is blocked:
+    check-mail.org's disposable flag and risk score stay out of the response
+    so this doesn't republish a third-party reputation feed's verdicts.
+    """
+    with _db() as conn:
+        rows = conn.execute(
+            "SELECT domain, classified_at "
+            "FROM signup_email WHERE domain_blocked = 1 "
+            "ORDER BY classified_at DESC"
+        ).fetchall()
+
+    grouped: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for domain, classified_at in rows:
+        if not domain:
+            continue
+        entry = grouped.get(domain)
+        if entry is None:
+            grouped[domain] = {
+                "domain": domain,
+                "signups": 1,
+                "first_blocked_at": classified_at,
+                "last_blocked_at": classified_at,
+            }
+        else:
+            entry["signups"] += 1
+            entry["first_blocked_at"] = classified_at
+
+    return _capped(list(grouped.values()), limit)
+
+
+def _capped(items: list[dict], limit: int) -> list[dict]:
+    """Apply a caller's ?limit on top of BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS. limit <= 0
+    means "as many as the ceiling allows"."""
+    ceiling = max(BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS, 0)
+    n = ceiling if limit <= 0 else min(limit, ceiling)
+    return items[:n]
+
+
 _init_db()
 
 # --- Signature verification ------------------------------------------------
@@ -604,12 +739,16 @@ def classify_email_domain(domain: str) -> tuple[bool, int]:
     return is_disposable, risk
 
 
-def register_email_domain_block(domain: str, acct: str) -> None:
+def register_email_domain_block(domain: str, acct: str) -> bool:
     """Register a flagged signup's email domain in Mastodon's native
     Admin::EmailDomainBlock, blocking future signups from that domain.
 
     Requires the admin:write:email_domain_blocks OAuth scope on
     ABUSE_BOT_TOKEN — see CLAUDE.md's moderator-token-gotcha section.
+
+    Returns True if the domain is blocked on the Mastodon side afterwards
+    (including the 422 "already blocked" case), so the caller only records it
+    as blocked when it really is — /api/blocks publishes those rows.
     """
     try:
         resp = httpx.post(
@@ -624,6 +763,8 @@ def register_email_domain_block(domain: str, acct: str) -> None:
             resp.raise_for_status()
     except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
         log.error("failed to register email_domain_block for %s (acct=%s): %s", domain, acct, exc)
+        return False
+    return True
 
 
 def process_signup(account_id: str, acct: str, ip: str, email: str = "",
@@ -662,15 +803,15 @@ def process_signup(account_id: str, acct: str, ip: str, email: str = "",
 
     if IP_SCRUTINY_ENABLED and ip:
         classification, org, ip_flagged, block_cidr = classify_signup_ip(ip)
-        record_signup_ip(account_id, acct, ip, classification, org, ip_flagged)
+        record_signup_ip(account_id, acct, ip, classification, org, ip_flagged, block_cidr)
 
         if ip_flagged:
             ip_strong_flagged = bool(set(classification.split("+")) & IP_SCRUTINY_STRONG_SIGNALS)
             log.warning("flagged signup acct=%s ip=%s classification=%s org=%s",
                         acct, ip, classification, org)
             if IP_SCRUTINY_AUTO_IPBLOCK and not IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN:
-                register_ip_block(ip, acct, org, block_cidr)
+                if register_ip_block(ip, acct, org, block_cidr):
-                mark_ipblock_registered(account_id)
+                    mark_ipblock_registered(account_id)
             prefix = "[DRY-RUN] " if IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN else ""
             reasons.append(f"{prefix}IP {ip} ({org or 'unknown org'}, {classification})")
             hold = hold or (IP_SCRUTINY_HOLD_WELCOME and not IP_SCRUTINY_DRY_RUN)
@@ -685,8 +826,8 @@ def process_signup(account_id: str, acct: str, ip: str, email: str = "",
             log.warning("flagged signup acct=%s email_domain=%s is_disposable=%s risk=%d",
                         acct, domain, is_disposable, risk)
             if CHECK_MAIL_AUTO_DOMAIN_BLOCK and not CHECK_MAIL_DRY_RUN:
-                register_email_domain_block(domain, acct)
+                if register_email_domain_block(domain, acct):
-                mark_email_domain_blocked(account_id)
+                    mark_email_domain_blocked(account_id)
             prefix = "[DRY-RUN] " if CHECK_MAIL_DRY_RUN else ""
             reasons.append(f"{prefix}email domain {domain} (disposable={is_disposable}, risk={risk})")
             hold = hold or (CHECK_MAIL_HOLD_WELCOME and not CHECK_MAIL_DRY_RUN)
@@ -975,7 +1116,7 @@ def classify_signup_ip(ip: str) -> tuple[str, str, bool, str]:
     return classification, intel["org"], bool(reasons), intel.get("cidr") or f"{ip}/32"
 
 
-def register_ip_block(ip: str, acct: str, org: str, cidr: str = "") -> None:
+def register_ip_block(ip: str, acct: str, org: str, cidr: str = "") -> bool:
     """Register a flagged signup's network in Mastodon's native Admin::IpBlock.
 
     cidr should be classify_signup_ip's block_cidr — the ASN/route-level
@@ -983,13 +1124,17 @@ def register_ip_block(ip: str, acct: str, org: str, cidr: str = "") -> None:
     datacenter/VPN/proxy block is blocked too, not just this one address.
     Falls back to a single-address block if no cidr is given or ip itself
     doesn't parse (defensive only; classify_signup_ip always supplies one).
+
+    Returns True if the range is blocked on the Mastodon side afterwards
+    (including the 422 "already blocked" case), so the caller only records it
+    as blocked when it really is — /api/blocks publishes those rows.
     """
     if not cidr:
         try:
             prefix_len = 32 if ipaddress.ip_address(ip).version == 4 else 128
         except ValueError:
             log.warning("skipping ip_block registration for unparseable ip=%r (acct=%s)", ip, acct)
-            return
+            return False
         cidr = f"{ip}/{prefix_len}"
     comment = f"welcomebot: flagged signup @{acct} ({org or 'unknown org'})"[:200]
     try:
@@ -1005,7 +1150,8 @@ def register_ip_block(ip: str, acct: str, org: str, cidr: str = "") -> None:
             resp.raise_for_status()
     except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
         log.error("failed to register ip_block for %s (acct=%s): %s", cidr, acct, exc)
-        return
+        return False
+    return True
 
 
 def count_distinct_reporters(target_id: str) -> int:
@@ -1147,8 +1293,8 @@ def handle_report(report_id: str, target_id: str, acct: str, is_local: bool,
 
             if CHECK_MAIL_AUTO_DOMAIN_BLOCK:
                 record_signup_email(target_id, acct, domain, is_disposable, risk, True)
-                register_email_domain_block(domain, acct)
+                if register_email_domain_block(domain, acct):
-                mark_email_domain_blocked(target_id)
+                    mark_email_domain_blocked(target_id)
             return
 
     try:
@@ -1215,6 +1361,67 @@ def healthz():
     return {"ok": True}
 
 
+# --- Blocklist API ---
+# Read-only JSON view of what this bot has auto-blocked, served unauthenticated
+# when BLOCKS_API_ENABLED is on (off by default — see the config block). It
+# reports only the bot's own record: blocks a human added by hand in Mastodon's
+# admin UI are not in here. Responses assert only that a range or domain is
+# blocked — no account handles, account ids or email addresses, and none of
+# the ipapi.is / check-mail.org classification data behind the decision (see
+# blocked_ip_ranges).
+
+
+def _blocks_guard(limit: int) -> int:
+    """404 unless the API is switched on for this deployment; a disabled
+    endpoint should be indistinguishable from one that doesn't exist. Returns
+    the sanitised limit."""
+    if not BLOCKS_API_ENABLED:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not Found")
+    return max(limit, 0)
+
+
+def _blocks_response(payload: dict) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(
+        payload,
+        headers={"Cache-Control": f"public, max-age={BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS}"},
+    )
+
+
+def _now_iso() -> str:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat()
+
+
+@app.get("/api/blocks")
+def api_blocks(limit: int = 0):
+    """Both blocklists in one document."""
+    limit = _blocks_guard(limit)
+    ip_ranges = blocked_ip_ranges(limit)
+    email_domains = blocked_email_domains(limit)
+    return _blocks_response({
+        "generated_at": _now_iso(),
+        "ip_ranges": {"count": len(ip_ranges), "items": ip_ranges},
+        "email_domains": {"count": len(email_domains), "items": email_domains},
+    })
+
+
+@app.get("/api/blocks/ip-ranges")
+def api_blocks_ip_ranges(limit: int = 0):
+    limit = _blocks_guard(limit)
+    items = blocked_ip_ranges(limit)
+    return _blocks_response({
+        "generated_at": _now_iso(), "count": len(items), "items": items,
+    })
+
+
+@app.get("/api/blocks/email-domains")
+def api_blocks_email_domains(limit: int = 0):
+    limit = _blocks_guard(limit)
+    items = blocked_email_domains(limit)
+    return _blocks_response({
+        "generated_at": _now_iso(), "count": len(items), "items": items,
+    })
+
+
 @app.post("/webhook")
 async def webhook(
     request: Request,

nginx/hooks.yttrx.com.conf

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ server {
         proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8087;
     }
 
+    # Read-only blocklist API (GET /api/blocks, /api/blocks/ip-ranges,
+    # /api/blocks/email-domains). Unauthenticated by design, and gated in the
+    # app by BLOCKS_API_ENABLED — with that unset the app 404s these paths,
+    # so proxying them here exposes nothing on its own.
+    location ^~ /api/blocks {
+        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8087;
+        proxy_set_header Host              $host;
+        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP         $remote_addr;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For   $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
+        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
+    }
+
     location / {
         return 404;
     }

test_local.py

@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ def ip_scrutiny_tests():
     ipblocks = []
     main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))
     main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
-    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr))
+    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr)) or True
     # A flagged-but-not-held signup starts the suspicious watch inline, which
     # would otherwise hit the network for a baseline snapshot — stub it.
     main.fetch_account_counts = lambda account_id: (0, 0)
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ def email_scrutiny_tests():
     domain_blocks = []
     main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))
     main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
-    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: domain_blocks.append((domain, acct))
+    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: domain_blocks.append((domain, acct)) or True
     # A flagged-but-not-held signup starts the suspicious watch inline, which
     # would otherwise hit the network for a baseline snapshot — stub it.
     main.fetch_account_counts = lambda account_id: (0, 0)
@@ -454,8 +454,8 @@ def combined_signal_tests():
     main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))
     main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
     main.apply_action = lambda target_id, action, text: actions.append((target_id, action))
-    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr))
+    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr)) or True
-    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: domain_blocks.append((domain, acct))
+    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: domain_blocks.append((domain, acct)) or True
     main.fetch_account_counts = lambda account_id: (0, 0)
 
     main.IP_SCRUTINY_ENABLED = True
@@ -546,8 +546,8 @@ def strong_ip_suspend_tests():
     main.send_welcome = lambda account_id, acct: sent.append((account_id, acct))
     main.dm_moderator = lambda message: dms.append(message)
     main.apply_action = lambda target_id, action, text: actions.append((target_id, action))
-    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr))
+    main.register_ip_block = lambda ip, acct, org, cidr: ipblocks.append((ip, acct, org, cidr)) or True
-    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: None
+    main.register_email_domain_block = lambda domain, acct: True
     main.fetch_account_counts = lambda account_id: (0, 0)
 
     main.IP_SCRUTINY_ENABLED = True
@@ -780,6 +780,86 @@ def suspicious_sweep_tests():
     assert any("[DRY-RUN]" in d and "dryrunbot" in d for d in dms), dms
 
 
+def blocks_api_tests():
+    """Drive the read-only blocklist API: the BLOCKS_API_ENABLED gate, the
+    response shape, the deliberate omission of provider classification data
+    and account identifiers, and the pre-block_cidr fallback."""
+    # Seed deterministic rows rather than relying on what earlier tests left
+    # in the shared db; assertions below check for presence, not exact lists.
+    main.record_signup_ip("900", "blockedone", "198.18.0.90", "datacenter",
+                          "Cloud Inc", True, "198.18.0.0/24")
+    main.mark_ipblock_registered("900")
+    # A second signup out of the same range collapses into one entry.
+    main.record_signup_ip("901", "blockedtwo", "198.18.0.91", "datacenter",
+                          "Cloud Inc", True, "198.18.0.0/24")
+    main.mark_ipblock_registered("901")
+    # Classified but never blocked -> must not appear at all.
+    main.record_signup_ip("902", "notblockedacct", "203.0.113.199", "clean", "", False)
+    # A row predating the block_cidr column (NULL) -> falls back to the /32
+    # that was in fact registered for it back then.
+    main.record_signup_ip("903", "legacyacct", "192.0.2.77", "datacenter", "Old Corp", True)
+    main.mark_ipblock_registered("903")
+
+    main.record_signup_email("910", "spamone", "blocked-example.test", True, 95, True)
+    main.mark_email_domain_blocked("910")
+    main.record_signup_email("911", "spamtwo", "blocked-example.test", True, 95, True)
+    main.mark_email_domain_blocked("911")
+    main.record_signup_email("912", "cleanacct", "notblocked-example.test", False, 0, False)
+
+    paths = ("/api/blocks", "/api/blocks/ip-ranges", "/api/blocks/email-domains")
+
+    # A. Disabled (the shipped default) -> 404, indistinguishable from a path
+    #    that doesn't exist.
+    main.BLOCKS_API_ENABLED = False
+    for path in paths:
+        assert client.get(path).status_code == 404, path
+
+    # B. Enabled -> 200, with the ranges and domains actually blocked.
+    main.BLOCKS_API_ENABLED = True
+    r = client.get("/api/blocks")
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.status_code
+    assert r.headers["cache-control"] == f"public, max-age={main.BLOCKS_API_CACHE_SECONDS}"
+    body = r.json()
+    ranges = {e["cidr"]: e for e in body["ip_ranges"]["items"]}
+    domains = {e["domain"]: e for e in body["email_domains"]["items"]}
+    assert body["ip_ranges"]["count"] == len(body["ip_ranges"]["items"])
+    assert body["email_domains"]["count"] == len(body["email_domains"]["items"])
+
+    assert "198.18.0.0/24" in ranges, ranges
+    assert ranges["198.18.0.0/24"]["signups"] == 2, "repeat signups collapse into one entry"
+    assert "192.0.2.77/32" in ranges, "a NULL block_cidr row falls back to its /32"
+    assert "blocked-example.test" in domains, domains
+    assert domains["blocked-example.test"]["signups"] == 2
+    assert "notblocked-example.test" not in domains, "an unblocked domain must not be listed"
+
+    # C. Nothing that identifies an account, and nothing sourced from the
+    #    ipapi.is / check-mail.org feeds, may appear in the response.
+    raw = r.text
+    for leak in ("blockedone", "legacyacct", "notblockedacct", "spamone", "cleanacct",
+                 "203.0.113.199", "datacenter", "Cloud Inc", "Old Corp"):
+        assert leak not in raw, f"{leak!r} must not be exposed by the blocklist API"
+    for entry in body["ip_ranges"]["items"]:
+        assert set(entry) == {"cidr", "signups", "first_blocked_at", "last_blocked_at"}, entry
+    for entry in body["email_domains"]["items"]:
+        assert set(entry) == {"domain", "signups", "first_blocked_at", "last_blocked_at"}, entry
+
+    # D. The per-list endpoints agree with the combined document.
+    ips_only = client.get("/api/blocks/ip-ranges").json()
+    domains_only = client.get("/api/blocks/email-domains").json()
+    assert ips_only["items"] == body["ip_ranges"]["items"]
+    assert domains_only["items"] == body["email_domains"]["items"]
+
+    # E. ?limit truncates; a nonsensical limit is treated as "no limit".
+    assert len(client.get("/api/blocks/ip-ranges?limit=1").json()["items"]) == 1
+    assert (client.get("/api/blocks/ip-ranges?limit=-5").json()["items"]
+            == ips_only["items"]), "a negative limit must not empty the list"
+
+    # F. BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS caps the caller's limit, not the other way round.
+    main.BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS = 1
+    assert len(client.get("/api/blocks/ip-ranges?limit=999").json()["items"]) == 1
+    main.BLOCKS_API_MAX_ITEMS = 5000
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     routing_tests()
     policy_tests()
@@ -790,4 +870,5 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
     strong_ip_suspend_tests()
     suspicious_watch_tests()
     suspicious_sweep_tests()
+    blocks_api_tests()
     print("ALL TESTS PASSED")